Sunday 20 January 2013

Free will & Determinism (in Psychology)


This is a paper I wrote for the 'Emerging Debates' module in my psychology degree.
The intention of publishing this paper is that I hope it can help others in their academic endeavours. If you'd like the full reference list, please contact me, I'd be happy to provide it.


Critically evaluate the utility of a key debate within psychology for understanding human behaviour.


Free will v Determinism


The classical debate of free-will and determinism has entertained the great minds of intellectual history for millennia. In discussing the origins of the debate, Wolfram (2002) notes throughout antiquity up until and including the Ancient Greeks, the dominant thought systems had incorporated notions of determinism and ‘unchangeable fate’. Typically, knowledge concerning future events were deciphered and foretold by numerous supernatural means, namely astrology. With the advent of religion however, it became incumbent upon its followers to accept the notion of free-action since God is Just and does not reward/punish those who are subject to compulsion or inescapable events (Wolfram, 2002).


With the inception of the Enlightenment period, philosophers such as Hobbes (1651/2012) and Hume (1748/2008) combined the two apparently disparate theories to form what is known today as compatibilism. The notion of compatabilism maintains the two theories are complimentary in that one’s options are preordained yet the act of deliberating from the options is free (Williams, 1980). A century later, any inclination of voluntary action was rebutted with the publication of On the Origins of Species (Darwin, 1859/2011). Although Darwinian theory seldom elaborates on free will, the principles of genetic hereditability and sexual selection purport partisanship towards the deterministic arm of the debate (Vannelli, 2001). Human behaviour is essentially the product of primitive instinctual drives that better one’s likelihood of survival and reproduction (Carlson, 2009).


During the early-mid 1900’s psychology had preoccupied itself with the scientific method and in doing so, gave prominence to sub-disciplines that were rigid and methodical in their respective epistemologies. From this backdrop, arose behaviourism. Skinner’s (1938, 1948, 1971) radical behaviourism proposes humans are bereft of free-will and voluntarism, rather, one is inextricably bound by a predetermined causal chain. Contemporary theorists in agreement with the classical compatibilists (such as Hobbes, 1651/2012; Hume, 1748/2008), revisited the notion of compatibility and the unification of the supposed dichotomy. Dennett (1984) diverges from the conventional premise in that he argues free-will is essentially intelligent / rational choice rather than ultimate free action. Intelligent choice is employed in the decision making (or ‘deliberating’) analysis when deciding from predetermined options.


In reference to the title of the essay, to ascertain the debate’s utility, one must understand the meaning of human behaviour. Of course, uncovering what lies beneath this term is dependent on one’s own theoretical orientation. Since the very advent of psychology, theorists have put forth differing classifications of what ‘human behaviour’ is and what psychologists should actually study. The classical schools of thought are underpinned by their respective ontological viewpoints and henceforth, there is no consensus regarding what is human behaviour and how it should be studied. In reaction to this, Nevitt (1965) notes psychology is fragmented, overspecialised and deeply method-centred. There is the unnecessary use of inflated jargon and professional baggage that confounds the discipline of psychology. So, theorising on the utility of the debate is inextricably bound to one’s own biases and penchants, and to ‘answer’ the essay question without acknowledging such biases and shortcomings, is injustice to the discipline itself.


Moreover, the same level of critique must be applied to the issue of utility. Since usefulness is a value that is highly subjective and contextually dependent, it must be noted what is ‘useful’ for one branch of psychology is of no significance to another. The same principle is true of psychology. The debate holds significance and has made contributions to particular areas of psychology (e.g. therapy, see Yalom, 2008), whereas other remits of psychology discard the notion of free-will altogether (e.g. Behaviourism, see Secord, 1984).


Nonetheless, to examine the utility, it is essential to consider research that has arisen (directly and indirectly) implicating notions of free-will and determinism. Research has consistently shown the belief in free-will invariably fosters prosocial behaviour, reduction in cheating and aggression, and a healthier work ethic (Baumeister, Masicampo and DeWall, 2009; Vohs and Schooler, 2008; Mueller and Dweck, 1998).

The implication being, if one maintains the belief that all events are preordained, mediating personal behaviour is futile since the outcome is already scripted. The conclusions drawn from the findings support a noteworthy contribution to human understanding in that in settings where prosocial and just behaviours are paramount i.e. education or the criminal justice system (CJS), it may be incumbent on the upholders of these institutions to instil belief in free-will in hope of creating a more helpful, just society.


In terms of contribution to specific remits, the area most pertinent to the debate is the concept of Self (Voss, 1997). The notion of free-will is the foundational basis of many a theory regarding the Self and personality, including, locus of control (see Rotter, 1966), environmental mastery (see Ryff, 1989), self-esteem (see Rosenberg, 1965) and self-determination (see Branden, 2004). The concepts are contingent upon one realising his/her inner resources of self-sufficiency after which, change is made (Branden, 2004).


Intertwined with the contribution to the Self, the debate also holds enormous pertinence in the area of therapy and individual differences. Autonomy, the free and un-coerced capacity of decision making (Rogers, 1961), is an innate resource possessed by all human beings, and the role of therapy is to ‘tap into’ this seminal resource to empower the individual (see Rogers, 1951; Maslow, 1943; Friedman, 2008). Consequently, the utility of the debate can be argued for in that much of therapy and mental illness in general, is dependent upon the understanding of personal volition.


Along with the obvious implications in self-actualisation and hierarchical advancement in person-centred therapy (PCT) (see Rogers, 1951; Maslow, 1954), existential therapy is also heavily reliant upon notions of being free. Yalom (1980), in his codification of existential therapy, outlines freedom (& responsibility) as one of the ‘four givens’ underpinning human nature. Jean-Paul Sartre (1943/1993), an influential existential philosopher famously wrote “we are condemned to be free”, and it is via this paradox of unavoidable freedom that one takes control of his life and understands the consequences, ultimately giving his life meaning. The utility of the debate is very much highlighted here in that understanding one is truly free, underpins many of the therapeutic processes seen today (Dryden and Mytton, 1999).


The application of the debate is also present in issues of mental health and forensic psychiatry (Meynen, 2010). An explicit reference to it can be found in the DSM-IV (APA, 1994, p. xxi), as it states a definitive characteristic of mental illness is an “important loss of freedom”.  The concurrent theme that dominates writings on free-will and mental health is the issue of diminished accountability (Frankfurt, 1971). Numerous disorders of the mind have been expounded upon in terms of diminished responsibility including, Obsessive-compulsive disorder (Walter, 2001), Kleptomania (Wolf, 1987) and Tourette’s syndrome (Libet, 1999). The implication being, a person who is ‘non-compis mentis’ (not of sound mind), has their freedom compromised and henceforth, is exonerated of criminal accountability (i.e. insanity plea) (Meynen, 2010).  Levy (2003, p. 214) also implicates cognitive neuroscience in mental health and free-will in that he posits sufferers of OCD are “mechanistically dictated by stereotyped scripts”. It is clear then the debate has impacted on numerous remits of knowledge and has contributed vastly towards enhancing our understanding of mental health.


The theme of personal responsibility is also the seminal issue in the CJS. Mens rea, the supposition of ‘guilty intent’ where the perpetrator is under no compulsion, is of moral competence and acts ‘freely’ in committing the crime, is a mandatory judicial component in criminal liability (Levander, 2004). Ultimately, the majority of the justice systems around the world view crime as a choice, an avoidable act, since ‘true justice’ cannot coexist with compulsion. However, in reference to biological determinism (see Rose et al, 1984), numerous studies implicate a biological basis for criminality. These include adoption studies (Tehrani and Mednick, 2000), twin studies (Mednick and Christiansen, 1977) chromosomal abnormalities (i.e. Klinefelters syndrome, see Price et al., 1966) and constitutional factors (Lombroso, 1876; Sheldon, 1949).


Though, neither system is faultless, in that legal definitions of free are usually convoluted, whilst the deterministic theories fall short as concordance rates are under no circumstances 100%. Nuances of the free-will determinism debate, in particular compatibilism, are seen in contemporary theories of crime. Criminality is typically explored as a diathesis stress model, whereby biology (determinism) is the predisposition, and the environment (free-will) is the adverse situation that ‘triggers’ criminal behaviours (Gross, 2010).


One of the most contentious implications of the debate is in the remit of sexuality. Research has indicated a biological (predetermined) basis for sexual orientation, these include; chromosomal studies (Harmer et al., 1993), twin studies (Bailey and Pillard, 1991), birth order (Blanchard and Klassen, 1997) and brain structure (Swaab and Hofman, 1990). Although no study has conclusively reduced sexuality down to a single gene, there are significant evidences that indicate a genetic dominance in sexual orientation. Taken altogether, research on genetics seem to undermine the notion of choice in sexuality. Since homosexuality is not an avoidable lifestyle choice, akin to race or gender, prejudice and stereotypes regarding non-heterosexuals should in theory disappear (Bindel, 2012). Again, the utility of the debate is explicitly alluded to here in that its deliberation is contributing towards social and attitudinal betterment and change.


To further understand the contribution, one must assess the impact the debate has had on psychology as a whole. In its attempt to mimic the hard sciences, psychology has become empirical and employs the hypothetico-deductive model formulated by Popper (1935). Resembling biology, mathematics, chemistry and physics, mainstream psychology too is in pursuit of natural immutable laws that invariably govern human phenomena (Dienes, 2008). Therefore, science (and psychology) lends itself to a deterministic outlook in that it operates on a basis of control and predictability and irregularities are typically dismissed.


However, research into quantum mechanics, under the banner of Chaos Theory (see Kellert, 1993), suggests even sub-atomic particles studied via strictly objective and systematic means are prone to biases and partialities. In 1927, against the monolithic nature of Newtonian theory, Heisenberg compellingly contended the mere act of ‘measuring’ a certain phenomenon can influence the phenomenon itself. This principle, known today as Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, suggests at even microscopic levels observer bias can occur, and if the experimenter can influence an inanimate sub-atomic particle out of deterministic controllability, the argument for complex and multifaceted human behaviour being free from control, is ever augmented.


This has profound implications in psychology and addresses two long-standing issues in the discipline. First, the debate regarding ‘should psychology be a science’ is alluded to here in that since all things are relative, bound by space, time and context, psychology’s infatuation of inflexibly clinging to the ‘empirical dream’ is actually detrimental to the subject (Gergen, 2001). In adhering to empirical methodologies that were originally codified for the use on particles, Gergen (2001) contends much of the irreducible human behaviour observed in everyday living is discarded since it cannot be subject to ‘rigorous testing’.


Secondly, in terms of the debate at hand, it has contributed towards critical thinking in that contemporary theories of knowledge advocate a holistic and relativist outlook (akin to postmodernism) that refutes the simplicities of ‘black and white’ dichotomous arguments. Anderson (1998) argues to genuinely ascertain the nature of human behaviour one must adopt an eclectic and critical outlook, where societal institutions (i.e. gender) are deconstructed and challenged. It is only through this orientation that psychology can become ‘whole’ and hold explanatory power.


In reference to the essay’s title, the notion that it is currently still a ‘key debate’ can be contended. In terms of the aforementioned research on prosocial behaviours and belief in free-will (paragraph 6), the debate can be argued to be inconsequential in that the prosocial behaviours are not contingent upon whether free-will actually exists, rather the belief in it. Hence, the time and energy (mis)spent by psychology trying to unravel a grand narrative that conclusively proves the existence of either system is futile. In debating this ancient-old issue, it is easy to transcend the realms of psychology and delve in to plain philosophical conjecture and as a result, its deliberation should be the concern of philosophers rather than psychologists (Dworkin, 1970). Psychology’s concern should be the impact of such beliefs and how in turn these beliefs affect one’s personality, interaction with others and issues of mental health.


Psychology is starting to evolve from the naturalist, ‘universal truth’ mentality to one where phenomena is studied in context with a relativist outlook (Anderson, 1998). Kudos now lies in a multimodal approach where the individual’s psychology is teamed with his social and biological influences to gain an eclectic understanding (Mautner, 2000). In terms of deliberating whether it is still a key debate, it can be argued that in terms of proving the existence of either system, it is obsolete in psychology. However, the beliefs that spawn from such systems are still of use to psychology today, as it is the beliefs that influence one’s behaviour, not the actual existence.


In terms of personal inclination to the debate, one must reference and make comparisons with his own personal belief systems, in this case, Islam. In terms of Islamic pre-decree, there are four fundamental principles:


1), God (Allah) is omnipotent and knows all things 
2), all details, past, present and future have been written by God (in the Preserved Tablet)
3), no action occurs except that it occurs by the Will of God and 
4), all things that happen are created by Allah in their essence, their attributes and their movements.


Regarding the first two principles, God mentions in the Qur’an (interpretation of meaning, 22:70), “Know you not that Allah knows all things that is in the heavens and on the earth? Verily, it is all in the Book. Verily, that is easy for Allah”. Regarding the 3rd and 4th principles God mentions (interpretation of meaning, 28:68) “And your Lord creates whatsoever He wills and chooses” and “Allah is the Creator of all things, and He is the Wakeel (Trustee, Disposer of affairs, Guardian) over all things” (interpretation of meaning, 39:62).


Although the verses are seemingly deterministic at first glance and are oxymoronic to the nature of sin and free-will, it is incumbent upon every Muslim to believe man is free in action and speech. The Writing (2nd principle) is unknown to mankind and therefore does not interfere with the choices he makes; personal volition is independent of the Writing. As God is All-Knowing, he need not you act out the act in order to write the action, therefore, as far as mankind is concerned, free-will exists as God’s foreknowledge does not interfere with personal action.


This is very much the personal view. However, as a Muslim residing in Britain who has been exposed to the Westernised educational system where precedence is always given to logic and evidence (and religion is very much on the decline), one sees no contradiction between the contemporary theories of free-will and Islamic orthodoxy. In fact, it can be argued that Dennett’s (1984) proposal of rational choice is complimentary with Islam in that one is pre-determined in terms of the options, but the act of choosing from the predestined options is still free.

Foyzul Rahman 20/01/2013
Recommended citation - Rahman, F. (2012).The Utility of the Free-will & Determinism Debate. http://knowledge-fozrahman.blogspot.com/2013/01/free-will-determinism-in-psychology.html

No comments:

Post a Comment